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CoRPORATIONS - STOCK OPTIONS - R.EQUIRBMBNTS OF CONSIDERATION FOR EMPLOYBB OPTIONs-The Delaware court, in two
recent decisions, has indicated what may be an increasingly strict
attitude toward employee stock options, particularly when granted to
executive officers or directors. It will be the purpose of this comment
to examine the significance of these decisions, and to attempt to
determine the extent of the change wrought by them.

I. Sufficiency of the Consideration for Stock Options

In Gottlieb 11. Heyden Chemical Corp.,1 a minority stockholder
attacked an option plan set up for the benefit of seven executives of the

1

(Del. Ch. 1952) 90 A. (2d) 660.
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corporation, six of whom were on the board of directors which approved
the plan. A majority of the stockholders ratified the directors' action.
The option price was to be set by the board of directors, but could not
be lower than 95% of the market price on the day the option was
granted. The option term was divided into thirds, and no more than
one third of the shares subject to the option could be purchased in any
one period, except that unpurchased shares could be carried forward.
The options were exercisable only as long as the optionee remained an
employee of the corporation except in cases of disablement and retirement. It was also provided that the board of directors might amend
or discontinue the plan at any time. On these facts, summary judgment
was refused to both parties, and the case was remanded for inquiry into
the respective values of the option and the services to be rendered by
the optionees. The court refused to accept a statement that the directors believed that the adoption of the plan would advance the interests
of the corporation as evidence of consideration, leaving the plan to be
set aside if the consideration to the corporation was found inadequate.
As this case illustrates, the question of what consideration will
support an employee option can be a difficult one. It is submitted that
two factors contribute largely to this difficulty. The .first of these arises
when the courts attempt to apply the law of private option contracts
to the corporate situation, or cast the problem in these terms. Between
private persons, an option is treated like other contracts, and legal consideration, or detriment, will support the promise to sell.2 In a private
contract, no investigation will be made of the equivalence of the consideration running to either party.3 However, when a corporation is
the grantor of the option, the equivalence of consideration may become
a question. If the option is not fairly commensurate in value with the
consideration received, an unauthorized gift of corporate assets may
appear, at least to the extent of the disparity, which may be attacked
by a dissenting stockholder despite majority rati.6.cation.4 However, at
least one court has analyzed the situation in terms of private contract
law, largely ignoring the more appropriate language of waste of corporate assets. 5
A second factor which complicates any attempted analysis of this
question is the reluctance, in varying degrees, on the part of the courts
to assess the adequacy of the consideration received by the corporation.
2 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. §5575 (1932).
3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §115 (1936).
4 Holthusen v. Budd Mfg. Co., (D.C. Pa.
5

1943) 52 F. Supp. 125.
Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S. (2d) 103 (1942).
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Quite understandably, the courts are hesitant to review the directors'
business judgment, particularly when there are no circumstances casting doubt upon the good faith of the directors in voting the compensation. 6 One court has distinguished "merely excessive" compensation
resulting from poor judgment "and not necessarily anything else," and
actually wasteful compensation resulting from a failure to relate the
compensation and the services by any recognized standard, the disparity
being so great as to indicate either bad faith or culpable indifference. 7
It is submitted that the difference between the two is only a difference
of degree, but the statement is indicative of the general hesitation to
second-guess an honest board of directors. Although the cases often
state that compensation must bear a reasonable relation to the services
rendered,8 the courts are generally loath to undertake an independent
investigation of this requisite reasonableness. There is, however, no
doubt that initial honesty and good judgment in the granting of
compensation will not operate to preclude an investigation by the courts
if circumstances change so as to make the compensation appear
unreasonable.9 Here it could be argued that there was fault in the
directors in not taking steps to keep the compensation reasonable under
the changed circumstances. One authority has suggested that, in effect,
the courts put aside the question of reasonableness and consider the
good faith of the directors or possibility of their bad faith, the fairness
of the plan, and compliance with formal legal requirements. 10 His
study indicated that the majority of the transactions approved by the
courts were arms-length dealings, while almost all of the transactions
invalidated were instances of self-dealing.11 At the very least, it seems
that self-dealing or other suspicious circumstances will shift the burden
of proof to the defendant corporation,1 2 and the courts are generally
unsympathetic to the option or other compensation in such cases.13
6Wight v. Heublein, (4th Cir. 1916) 238 F. 321; Moore v. Linahan, (2d Cir. 1941)
117 F. (2d) 140; Politz v. Wabash R.R. Co., 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E. 721 (1912);
Holthusen v. Budd Mfg. Co., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 125; Clamitz v. Thatcher, (2d
Cir. 1947) 158 F. (2d) 687; Sandler v. Schenley Industries, (Del. 1951) 79 A. (2d) 606.
7 McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., (D.C. Md. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 639 at
649.
s Clamitz v. Thatcher, (2d Cir. 1947) 158 F. (2d) 687; Holthusen v. Budd Mfg.
Co., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 125; Koplar v. Warner Bros., (D.C. Del. 1937) 19 F.
Supp. 173; Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., (Del. 1948) 64 A. (2d) 581;
Nemser v. Aviation Corp., (D.C. Del. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 515.
9 Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 53 S.Ct. 731 (1933).
l0W.AsHINGTON, CoRPoRATB EXEcUTIVEs' CoMPENSATION 295 (1942).
11 Id. at 259.
12 47 MrCH. L. R:sv. 1179 (1949).
1s See Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Co., (Del. 1948) 60 A. (2d) 106.
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Another circumstance which augurs ill for an option plan appears
when the beneficiaries are already employees of the grantee. In this
case, there is a good chance that the option will be construed as retroactive compensation for past services rendered for an agreed remuneration, and hence invalid for want of consideration.14 However, an exception is made to this rule in two cases: (I) where there is an implied
contract, and (2) where the amount is not unreasonable in view of the
services rendered.15 In most of the recent cases upholding an employee
option, it was granted in connection with an initial or renewal employment contract, and the court placed some reliance upon the fact that
the option was a material inducement to enter the contract.16 On the
other hand, at least two of the recent cases invalidating employee
options were cases where the beneficiaries were already employed by
the company.17 Several states have statutes permitting the grant of
options to existing employees.18 In other states, it might well be
necessary to rely upon one of the exceptions to the rule against retroactive compensation to uphold such an option. The fact that the
optionee is already in the employ of the corporation could weaken the
option in another manner, viz., that the transaction is less likely to be
at arms length.
A final factor, bearing at least indirectly on most of the points
discussed above, is the option price. Since the value of the option
depends in large measure on the difference between the option and the
market price, this factor becomes very important in any case where the
adequacy of the consideration is decided. Most of the options carry a
14 Stafford's Estate v. Progressive Nat. Farm Loan Assn., 207 La. 1097, 22 S. (2d)
662 (1945); Paul v. Cohn, 257 App. Div. 1027, 13 N.Y.S. (2d) 626 (1939); Hurt v.
Cotton States Fertilizer Co., (5th Cir. 1947) 159 F. (2d) 52; 40 A.L.R. 1432 (1926). The
same problem can arise also when the stock is purchased under the option.
15 Wyles v. Campbell, (D.C. Del. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 343; Blish v. Thompson
Automatic Arms Corp., (Del. 1948) 64 A. (2d) 581; Wiseman v. Musgrave, 309 Mich.
523, 16 N.W. (2d) 60 (1944); Osborne v. United Gas Improvement Co., 354 Pa. 57,
46 A. (2d) 208 (1946); Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures, (D.C. Del. 1937) 19 F. Supp.
173; 88 A.L.R. 754 (1934).
16 Sandler v. Schenley Industries, (Del. 1951) 79 A. (2d) 606; Wise v. Universal
Corp., (D.C. Del. 1950) 93 F. Supp. 393; Wyles v. Campbell, (D.C. Del. 1948) 77 F.
Supp. 343; Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S. (2d) 103 (1942); McQuillen v. National Cash
Register Co., (D.C. Md. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 639.
11 Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., (Del. 1948) 60 A. (2d) 106; Holthusen v.
Budd, (D.C. Pa. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 125
1s Cal. Corp. Code (Deering, 1948) §1107; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 41, §40; Idaho
Code (1948) §30-120(7); lli. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 52, §157.24; Mich.
Comp. Laws (1948) §450.24; Mass. Laws Ann. (1948) c. 158, §§26-28; N.J. Rev. Stat.
(1937) §14:9-1; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §54-313; N.Y. Stock Corp. Law (McKinney,
1940) §14; Ohio Gen. Code (Baldwin, 1948) §8623-36; 15 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938)
§138.
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fixed price,1 9 and it has been stated that the disparity between the
option and market prices at the time of the grant could be so great as
to constitute constructive fraud. 20 Although no case found discusses this
point directly, it is interesting to note that most of the options called for
a price equal to or higher than the market price at the time of the
grant, and that the option was set aside in the one case in which the
option price was below the market price.21 It is suggested that an option
price below the market price might justify a close scrutiny of the plan
since it undercuts the normally strong justification that options are
incentive compensation. If the option price is set at the then market, the
executive receives nothing except as his efforts, and perhaps other
factors, contribute to the corporation's successful operation resulting in
an increase in the market price. On the other hand, if the option price
is below market, there is a present benefit to the executive for which
justification may be more difficult to find.
Remembering the facts in the Gottlieb case, the action taken by the
Delaware court is not surprising. Six of the nine directors approving the
option plan were to benefit under it, the optionees were already in the
employ of the company, there was no employment contract involved,
and the option price could be set below the market price at the time the
option was granted. This would seem a rather strong case for the close
scrutiny intended by the Delaware court in remanding the case for an
investigation into the adequacy of the consideration.

II. Assurance of Receiving Contemplated Consideration
In Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 22 decided the same day as
the Gottlieb case, the Delaware court invalidated an option plan on the
ground that no circumstances or conditions existed which would insure
that the contemplated consideration would in fact pass to the corporation. In this case, the plan approved by the directors was submitted by
a disinterested committee, and subsequently ratified by a majority of the
stockholders. The options were to be given to certain executives of the
corporation, and were exercisable any time within five years from the
date of issuance, but not later than six months after the termination of
19 This is permissible under I.R.C., §l30A(d)(l)(A), which provides for favorable
tax treatment of restricted stock options. See Pavenstedt, "The Second Circuit Reaffirms
the Efficacy of Restrictive Stock Agreements to Control Estate Tax Valuation," 51 MxcH,

L. REv. l (1952).
20 Clamitz v. Thatcher, (2d Cir. 1947) 158 F. (2d) 687.
21 Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., (Del. 1948) 60 A. (2d) 106.
22 (Del. 1952) 90 A. (2d) 652.
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the employment of the optionee. The option price was approximately
the market price at the time the plan was formulated. There was
evidence that three of the optionees entered the corporation's employ
expecting to be given the opportunity to purchase stock, or regarding
their salary as only partial compensation. 23 Thus it would seem that
there were several factors present which usually indicate a favorable
treatm~t of employee options. Only the facts that the optionees were
directors and existing employees militated against the plan. In view of
the previous discussion, it would seem that the court should have gone
no farther than to investigate the adequacy of the consideration
running to the corporation for the options. However, it stated that such
an investigation was not necessary,24 and invalidated the option for the
reason stated above, pointing to the fact that it could be exercised after
the optionees left the corporation's employ.
The court apparently assumed, without the aid of evidence, that the
contemplated consideration was the retention of the optionees in the
corporation's employ. However, it could have been argued that the
options were retroactive compensation, and that this case fell into either
· of the two exceptions to the rule against such retroactivity. 25 The fact
that there was an expectation of an opportunity to purchase stock, and
that the present salary was not regarded as the whole compensation,
could give rise to the inference of a contract to give the option. In
addition, it might have been found that the compensation was not
unreasonable in view of the fact that these men had resucitated a dying
business and were instrumental in its present prosperity.
On the other hand, several cases, in assessing the consideration for
an option, have considered factors which would and would not assure
retention of the employees' services, at least during the option period.
However, this was not done as a search for a separate prerequisite to
validity, which was what such assurance was held to be in the Kerbs
case. Thus in Holthusen v. Budd Mfg. Co., 26 a federal court rejected
a plan because the value of the options granted had little or no relation
to the value of the services to be rendered. This finding was made
largely because the grantees were under no obligation to continue in
the company's employ for any specific period of time. 27 The court
stated that the absence of any relationship between the length of time
2s Id. at 656.
24 lbid.
25 See cases cited in note
26 (D.C. Pa. 1943) 52 F.

21 Id. at 129.

15.
Supp. 125.
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an optionee must work and the right to exercise his option rendered the
grant of the option a disbursement of valuable property without
consideration other than the hope of a continuance of the optionee's
services for an indefinite period.28 However, when the plan was
amended to require a year's employment before the option could be
exercised, and provided that it could be exercised thereafter only while
the optionee remained in the company's employ, it was upheld in a
subsequent decision by the same court.20 Similarly, stock options have
been upheld upon a finding that the optionee was bound by contract,30
that some circumstance insured the retention of the optionee's services,
such as a divestiture of prior business interests,31 or simply that the
option could be exercised only while in the company's employ.32 Thus
it can be seen that a result similar to that in the Kerbs case has been
reached on similar facts, but based simply upon a determination that
the consideration for the option was inadequate.
It is submitted that the rule stated in the Kerbs case is no innovation
if used as a tool in weighing the sufficiency of the consideration for an
option, where such inquiry seems warranted. It would seem clear that
an undertaking which the promissor may or may not perform, the
choice being entirely his, is illusory and no consideration at all. 33
However, the Delaware court did not apply the rule in this manner; it
will be remembered that it stated this rule immediately following a
statement that an inquiry into the relation between the services to be
rendered and the options was unnecessary.34 If the "assurance rule" is
treated as a separate basis on which to judge the validity of a stock
option, divorced from a determination of the sufficiency of the
consideration running to the corporation, it would permit the courts to
review the business judgment of the directors in every case, whether
or not such investigation is warranted by reason of fraud, self-dealing or
other factors casting suspicion upon the transaction. The chances of
mischief are further increased by the fact that in many cases, as in the
2BJd. at 130.
29 Holthusen v. Budd Mfg. Co., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 53 F. Supp. 488.
3 0 Wyles v. Campbell, (D.C. Del. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 343; Wise v.

Universal Corp.,
(D.C. Del. 1950) 93 F. Supp. 393. It is interesting to note in the latter case that the
contract involved was between the individual defendants and a subsidiary of the corporate
defendant, rather than directly between the two.
Sl Sandler v. Schenley Industries, (Del. 1951) 79 A. (2d) 606.
32 McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., (D.C. Md. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 639;
Clamitz v. Thatcher, (2d Cir. 1947) 158 F. (2d) 687; Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S. (2d)
103 (1942).
as WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs §§IA, 104 (1936).
34 Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, (Del. 1952) 90 A. (2d) 652 at 656.
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Kerbs case, the court will be fairly· free to decide for itself what the
contemplated consideration was. This is particularly true if the courts
continue to follow the tendency which appears in the cases of equating
retention of the employees' services with the contemplated consideration. That this is not always the case is strikingly illustrated by Abrams
v. Allen,35 in which an option was upheld, although it was exercised
after the termination of the employment contract of which it was a part.
Viewed in this light, it seems that the Kerbs case represents a clear
departure from the old rule that the reasonableness of the compensation
of the employees is in the first instance a business affair to be handled
by those in charge of the business, and that the courts will not interfere
in the absence of fraud, self-dealing or culpable indifference.36 It is in
this possible departure from a rule, widely accepted and proved by
experience, that the significance of these decisions by the Delaware
court seems to lie.

George D. Miller, Jr., S.Ed.

35 36 N.Y.S. (2d) 174 (1942), affd. 266 App. Div.
36 See the cases cited in note 6; see also Mercantile

835, 42 N.Y.S. (2d) 641 (1943).
Trading Co. v. Rosenbaum Grain
Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 325, 154 A. 325 (1931); Davis v. Louisville Gas and Electric Co., 16
Del. Ch. 157, 142 A. 654 (1928); Belle Isle Corp. v. MacBean, (Del. 1948) 61 A. (2d)
699.

